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ABSTRACT 
This Article addresses a specific question around bills of rights: 
How are these instruments drafted? Drawing upon the findings of 
research projects funded by the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust (the 
“JRCT”), the Article examines the Northern Ireland experience, a 
place where the process is ongoing. In particular, the Article explores 
conceptual and practical matters involved in drafting bills of rights in 
post-conflict societies. The Article suggests that Northern Ireland 
merits consideration when one reflects on models for the facilitation of 
public participation in constitutional projects. What happened to the 
course of the debate on a bill of rights in Northern Ireland also raises 
hard questions about how to design an effective process in the context 
of ethno-national division. This Article contributes to discussions on 
human rights reform in deeply divided societies by examining the 
Northern Ireland experience. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The adoption of bills of rights is ubiquitous and has been 
described as a “booming industry”.1 The process of designing bills of 
rights in contexts of ethno-national conflict is, however, poorly 
understood. Using Northern Ireland as a case study (where the process 
is ongoing) this Article asks the question: What are the conceptual and 
practical difficulties involved in drafting bills of rights in post-conflict 
societies? Our aim is to facilitate a better understanding of the choices 
faced by drafters. 
The Article argues that although Northern Ireland does not have a 
bill of rights at the time of the Article’s publication, the process is a 
useful example that merits further study, as a model for the facilitation 
of public participation in the drafting of bills of rights and constitutions 
elsewhere. This begs the obvious question: If the process is worthy of 
consideration, why did it fail to produce a bill of rights? 
We argue that this stagnation is indicative of the challenges of 
designing a bill of rights in contexts of deep ethno-national conflict, 
where the language of human rights is woven into inter-communal 
contestation. In Northern Ireland the major political conflict remains 
between unionists/loyalists, who wish to retain the Union with Britain, 
and nationalists/republicans, who seek a United Ireland. This is still 
embedded across public and private life in a region that often functions 
 
1. RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE 
NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 220 (2004). 
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through forms of communal coding. Words that may have particular 
meanings in legal texts, and that flow from international instruments, 
will be heard and understood differently depending on context.  
The Northern Ireland process demonstrates what is already well-
known: that in deeply divided societies “law is not always viewed as 
politically neutral and objective”.2 The notions of “neutrality and 
impartiality” are themselves contested in such contexts. The use of 
legal instruments and arguments takes place in situations where 
constitutional perspectives will often determine what is seen and heard. 
This has, for example, shaped mainstream unionist parties’ approaches 
(predominantly the Ulster Unionist Party (“UUP”) and the Democratic 
Unionist Party (“DUP”)) to the bill of rights.3 One commentator has 
noted that unionist ideas about what a bill of rights should encompass 
are deeply informed by perceptions of the legitimacy of the state and 
its institutions.4 As this Article will suggest, the Northern Ireland bill 
of rights process is a manifestation of a distinctive political context, and 
arguments around human rights reform became a further site of 
constitutional contestation. 
The Article builds on the work of both Authors over many years.5 
It offers evidence to support the view that in the wake of Brexit there 
is a need for enhanced consideration of human rights reform. Although 
the focus is on Northern Ireland, the debate is taking place against the 
backdrop of wider reflections on constitutional reform in the UK,6 as 
well as intensified conversations about the future of the island of 
 
2. Louise Mallinder, Metaconflict and International Human Rights Law in Dealing with 
Northern Ireland’s Past, 8 CAMBRIDGE INT’L L.J. 5, 11 (2019). 
3. ANNE SMITH ET AL., POLITICAL CAPACITY BUILDING: ADVANCING A BILL OF RIGHTS 
FOR NORTHERN IRELAND ch. 2 (2014), 
https://www.ulster.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/58271/Advancing_a_BOR_NI.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QB5R-TSEW]. 
4. See, e.g., Catherine Turner, Political Representations of Law in Northern Ireland, 3 
PUB. L. 451 (2010). 
5. SMITH ET AL., supra note 3; Anne Smith & Colin Harvey, Where Next for A Bill of 
Rights for Northern Ireland? (2018), 
https://www.ulster.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/341987/Full-Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NCV6-6KAU]; Colin Harvey, Northern Ireland and a Bill of Rights for the 
United Kingdom (2016), 
https://www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk/sites/default/files/NI%20BOR%20178.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6KBB-6VL3]. Although this Article draws upon the fieldwork conducted for 
the research projects noted above, the views here are those of Harvey and Smith alone. 
6. Vernon Bogdanor, Brexit Could Prove to Be Britain’s Constitutional Moment, LONDON 
SCH. ECON. & POL. SCI. BLOG (Feb. 27, 2019), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2019/02/27/brexit-
could-prove-to-be-britains-constitutional-moment/ [https://perma.cc/BAV7-75BU]. 
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Ireland. Furthermore, the Northern Ireland experience is a cautionary 
tale for any divided/post-conflict society faced with similar challenges. 
How do you create common ground for such a constitutional enterprise 
in a society where there is still deep ethno-national contestation? 
This Article is underpinned by two main themes. First, the Article 
argues that designing and drafting bills of rights in the context of ethno-
national division must be conducted and understood against the local 
background political context in which it is immersed. Second, the 
Article analyzes the roles of political support and leadership. This 
theme has created difficulties for post-conflict societies such as 
Northern Ireland, when some of the key political protagonists have a 
“differential affinity to rights”, and where the “sovereign government” 
is often unwilling to advance rights-based reform.7 To that end, and 
although it is not the complete picture, bills of rights potentially 
become a site where political antagonisms are simply rehearsed, thus 
creating further alienation. This raises contextual questions in Northern 
Ireland where it is possible—both legally and politically—for robust 
interventions from the “sovereign government” and Westminster 
Parliament. 
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part I we note what a bill of 
rights can do. Part II defines what we mean by “divided/post-conflict 
societies.” As a comprehensive account of the term “divided/post-
conflict society” is beyond the scope of this Article, we do not offer a 
detailed analysis of the prodigious bodies of work on this term.8 Instead 
we draw upon key works by political scientists and from within the 
transitional justice literature to frame our argument.9 Part III examines 
the divergent approaches to human rights by the main political parties. 
 
7. Robin Whitaker, Debating Rights in the New Northern Ireland, 25 IRISH POL. STUD. 
23, 27 (2010). 
8. See, e.g., ADRIAN GUELKE, POLITICS IN DEEPLY DIVIDED SOCIETIES (2012); AREND 
LIJPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES: A COMPARATIVE EXPLORATION (1977); 
Donald L. Horowitz, The Challenge of Ethnic Conflict: Democracy in Divided Societies, 4 J. 
DEMOCRACY 18 (1993); DONALD L. HOROWITZ, A DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA? 
CONSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING IN A DIVIDED SOCIETY (1991); Sujit Choudhry, Bridging 
Comparative Politics and Comparative Constitutional Law: Constitutional Design in Divided 
Societies, in CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN FOR DIVIDED SOCIETIES: INTEGRATION OR 
ACCOMMODATION? 3 (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2008); Ian Lustick, Stability in Deeply Divided 
Societies: Consociationalism Versus Control, 31 WORLD POL. 325 (1979). 
9. See, e.g., RUTI TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (2000); Patricia Lundy & Mark 
McGovern, Whose Justice? Rethinking Transitional Justice from the Bottom Up, 35 J. L. & 
SOC’Y 265 (2008); Colm Campbell et al., The Frontiers of Legal Analysis: Reframing the 
Transition in Northern Ireland, 66 MODERN L. REV. 317 (2003). 
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Part IV addresses the specific provisions in the Belfast/Good Friday 
Agreement (the “Agreement”). Part V focuses on the Northern Ireland 
bill of rights process. Parts VI, VII, and VIII then explore the Northern 
Ireland Human Rights Commission’s (the “Commission”) advice and 
the responses to it. We conclude by setting out tentative 
recommendations on possible ways forward. 
II. WHAT CAN A BILL OF RIGHTS DO? 
While this Article examines the role of bills of rights, this does 
not imply that other attempts to combat discrimination and inequality 
are of less value. There is always a risk of overstating the significance 
of such constitutional documents. What a bill of rights can do is provide 
an overarching point of reference that becomes a normative framework 
for further legal and political developments. It can support good 
governance by creating a rights-informed structure of accountability; a 
bill of rights can therefore be part of a wider project of shaping effective 
governance and holding government to account.10 So they can assist in 
ensuring that “legislation, policy and practice does not deny 
fundamental rights . . . [Bills of rights] limit the actions of politicians 
in order to strengthen democracy rather than undermining it.”11 They 
also inform how power is exercised and policies are designed. A bill of 
rights that only lives in courtrooms is not a constitutional document 
worth having. 
Bills of rights therefore are put in place to uphold rights and 
facilitate political accountability and good governance. They are a 
useful mechanism to assure people that whoever is the Minister, 
irrespective of their particular personal views, everyone’s rights must 
be respected and protected. However, we acknowledge that for some, 
bills of rights are controversial, especially for those from the 
“democratic positivism”12 school of thought, and “court sceptics”13 
 
10. Kader Asmal sees this role as government “being kept on its toes”. See Kader Asmal, 
Designing a Bill of Rights for a Diverse Society, Speech to Chatham House, London (Sept. 26, 
2007) (transcript on file with author). 
11. N. IR. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, IS THAT RIGHT? FACT AND FICTION ON A BILL OF 
RIGHTS 9, 13 (2012), 
https://www.nihrc.org/uploads/publications/Fact_and_Fiction_on_a_Bill_of_Rights-
_Is_that_Right.pdf [https://perma.cc/25JG-JX4G]. 
12. Murray Hunt, Reshaping Constitutionalism, in JUDGES, TRANSITION AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS CULTURES 467, 468 (John Morison et al. eds., 2007). 
13. Janet L. Hiebert, Parliamentary Bills of Rights: An Alternative Model?, 69 MODERN 
L. REV. 7, 10 (2006). 
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such as Waldron,14 Allan15 and Dahl.16 These scholars share an 
antipathy to strong judicial review, and are concerned with courts 
having the final say on the meaning of rights. Hiebert, who coined the 
term “court sceptic”, describes the position as attaching to someone 
who accepts “the legitimacy of individual rights but doubt[s] the 
prudence of giving courts final responsibility for interpreting and 
resolving political disagreements involving rights, for a range of 
reasons such as democratic concerns or institutional competence”.17 It 
is beyond the scope of this Article to address the arguments based on 
democracy and institutional competency, but there continues to be 
extensive debate.18 For the purposes of this Article we draw upon the 
“court sceptic” narrative to help explain mainstream unionism’s 
approach to human rights, and in particular responses to the bill of 
rights.19 
III. DIVIDED/POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES 
All societies are, to different degrees, divided and pluralist—that 
is obvious, but it does not get us very far. “Deeply divided societies”, 
as defined by political scientists such as Guelke,20 Lijphart,21 
Horowitz,22 and Choudhry,23 exhibit particular traits that complicate 
 
14. Waldron’s relevant writings include: Jeremy Waldron, A Right-Based Critique of 
Constitutional Rights, 13 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 18 (1993); JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND 
DISAGREEMENT (1999); Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review 115 
YALE L.J. 1346 (2006); Jeremy Waldron, Taking Group Rights Carefully, in LITIGATING 
RIGHTS: PERSPECTIVES FROM DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Grant Huscroft & Paul 
Rishworth eds. 2002); JEREMY WALDRON, POLITICAL POLITICAL THEORY: ESSAYS ON 
INSTITUTIONS CENTURY (2016). 
15. See, e.g., James Allan, The Effect of a Statutory Bill of Rights where Parliament is 
Sovereign: The Lesson from New Zealand, in SCEPTICAL ESSAYS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, 375 (Tom 
Campbell, Keith Ewing, & Adam Tomkins eds. 2001). 
16. See generally ROBERT DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (1989). 
17. Hiebert, supra note 13. 
18. See, e.g., PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH BILLS OF RIGHTS: COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVES (Philip Alston ed., 1999); see also Mary L. Volcansek, Judicialization of Politics 
or Politicization of the Courts in New Democracies?, in JUDICIAL POWER: HOW 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AFFECT POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION 66 (Christine Landfried ed., 
2019); See Waldron writings cited supra note 14. 
19. In this context, see, e.g., Peter Munce, Unionists as ‘Court Sceptics’: Exploring Elite 
Level Unionist Discourses about a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights, 15 BRITISH J. POL. & INT’L 
REL. 647 (2013). 
20. See generally GUELKE, supra note 8. 
21. See generally LIJPHART, supra note 8. 
22. See generally Horowitz, supra note 8. 
23. See generally Choudhry, supra note 8. 
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political processes, and this may lead to stasis, crisis, or conflict. First, 
they exhibit what political scientists have called “antagonistic 
segmentation”—there is a political fragmentation into camps which 
share little overlapping membership—consequently there is a 
breakdown in relations between groups.24 “Antagonistic 
segmentation”, according to political scientists, is generated by 
“ascriptive ties” that are based on “terminal identities with high 
political salience, sustained over a substantial period and a wide variety 
of issues. As a minimum condition, boundaries between rival groups 
must be sharp enough so that membership is clear and, with few 
exceptions, unchangeable”.25 The phrase “terminal identities”26 means 
that identities are often assumed to be “closed” and fixed. It is not how 
identity actually is, but how it is assumed to be. “Ascriptive ties” means 
that people are placed in a group or segment because of qualities 
beyond their control—identities are assumed or acquired at birth, such 
as race, language or ethnicity.27 A high political value is attached to 
these differences or “markers”28 and they become “politically salient”29 
and thus division acquires overriding importance. 
The significance of sustained division is also discussed by 
Lustick.30 He comments that in such societies the fault line is viewed 
as so central that its impact and influence extends widely.31 This makes 
it difficult, if not impossible, to reach agreement on politically 
contentious issues, such as a bill of rights. Notwithstanding this 
difficulty, the process of debating and negotiating a bill of rights can 
be of intrinsic value, particularly in any attempt to create a sense of 
shared values amongst different ethno-cultural groups. In other words, 
it is a process where people may strive to create a polity where equal 
status is a reality. Choudhry terms this “civic citizenship”.32 However, 
as noted earlier, it may also serve simply to highlight established 
political disagreements, and there is much in the Northern Ireland 
experience that supports this interpretation. There is often a strong 
element of predictability about the eventual outcome. Furthermore, as 
 
24. Lustick, supra note 8, at 325. 
25. Id. 
26. See id. at 326. 
27. Id. 
28. Choudhry, supra note 8, at 5. 
29. Id. 
30. See generally Lustick, supra note 8. 
31. See generally id. 
32. Choudry has credited this phrase to Ernest Renan. See Choudhry, supra note 8, at 6. 
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the next Part explores, for deeply divided societies that are in 
“transition”,33 some sections of the community even find the concept 
of “transition” difficult and “inapplicable”.34 In such contexts, people 
can inhabit distinctive linguistic frameworks and see the same subject 
in radically different ways. 
IV. NORTHERN IRELAND AS A POST-CONFLICT/TRANSITIONAL 
SOCIETY AND APPROACHES TO HUMAN RIGHTS 
Mallinder argues that “Unionist self-identification with the State 
means that actions that are perceived as anti the British State are also 
perceived as anti-Unionist”.35 Therefore any measure, such as a bill of 
rights that would be used to challenge the state and to hold the state 
accountable, risks being viewed with suspicion. This also maps onto 
forms of skepticism about judicial activism. As bills of rights impose 
limitations and constraints on the exercise of legislative and executive 
power, and give judges a more expansive role, they have been viewed 
with “caution”36 by mainstream unionism, as some believe that the “the 
judiciary should not be permitted to assume the role of the legislative 
branch of government”.37 The preservation of the stability of the 
existing constitutional arrangements will often take precedence over 
anything perceived as disruptive. While mainstream unionism is itself 
not a monolith, and has shifted positions over time, Turner argues that 
for the main unionist parties “any attempt to pre-empt the outcome of—
or indeed to foreclose—a democratic process is inherently anti-
democratic and is to be resisted, as such political questions should be 
left to a democratic and accountable Assembly”.38 
Unionist understandings of human rights must also be viewed in 
relation to specific concerns about judicial interventions (both before 
the United Kingdom courts and the European Court of Human Rights) 
on the legacy of the conflict, the use of lethal force by the state, and 
 
33. The term “transition” encompasses a diversity of social and political processes and has 
different axes. For an excellent discussion on this, see generally Fionnuala Ní Aoláin and Colm 
Campbell, The Paradox of Transition in Conflicted Democracies, 27 HUM. RTS. Q. 172 (2005); 
Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 69 (2003). 
34. Mallinder, supra note 2, at 13. 
35. Id. at 17. 
36. Democratic Unionist Party, A Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland?, 9-10 (2003) (on file 
with author). 
37. Id. 
38. Turner, supra note 4, at 455. 
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collusion in particular.39 As “Unionists generally view the State as a 
benign, and even deified, entity . . . calls to investigate State abuses or 
to adopt measures to curb them in the future are antithetical to their 
interests”.40 According to a DUP spokesperson, “people in Northern 
Ireland react to the concept of rights in a particular way . . . and that is 
because ‘rights’ by their very nature are often used against the state and 
using it this way in Northern Ireland was relatively polarizing.”41 
The current leader of the largest unionist party, the DUP, Arlene 
Foster states that “human rights is like a foreign language to most 
[referring to Unionists]”.42 This alienation towards rights discourse is 
also shared by the other mainstream Unionist party, the UUP: “if you 
look at how rights play out, unionists probably feel that it has not been 
advantageous to their community”.43 This does not “[equate] to an 
absolute rejection of human rights among Unionists”.44 There is a need 
to be “wary of falling prey to the positing of a rigid dichotomy between 
unionist and nationalist political cultures . . . as it is not as monolithic 
as it is often portrayed”.45 For example, over the years there have been 
moments when unionists/loyalists have taken a more generous view of 
human rights discourse in general, and on matters of specific communal 
concern.46 For example, historical policy documents from the two main 
unionist parties constructed a bill of rights as an essential tool to protect 
 
39. See generally McKerr v. United Kingdom, 34 Eur. Ct. H.R. 553 (2001); Jordan v. 
United Kingdom, 37 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2 (2003); Finucane v. United Kingdom 37 Eur. Ct. H.R. 29 
(2003); Kelly v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001); Shanaghan v. United Kingdom, Eur. 
Ct. H.R. (Apr. 4, 2000); In re Finucane (NI) [2019] UKSC 7, (2019). 
40. Mallinder, supra note 2, at 17. 
41. Interview by Jonathan Bell, former MLA, with Emma Little-Pengelly, Special Adviser 
to the First Minister, DUP (May 21, 2013) (on file with author). 
42. See Arlene Foster, Protestants Need Rights Explained to Them, 411 FORTNIGHT, at 13 
(Feb. 2003); See generally Mick Fealty et al., A Long Peace?: The Future of Unionism in 
Northern Ireland (Slugger O’Toole, 2003); Omar Grech, Human Rights and the Northern 
Ireland Conflict: Law, Politics and Conflict 1921–2014 (Routledge, Abingdon/New York, 
2017); Munce, supra note 19. 
43. SMITH ET AL., supra note 3, at 41 (quoting a June 7, 2013 interview with Mike Nesbitt, 
MLA, UUP). 
44. Mallinder, supra note 2, at 18. 
45. COLIN HARVEY & ALEX SCHWARTZ, Judicial Empowerment in Divided Societies: The 
Northern Ireland Bill of Rights Process in Comparative Perspective, in RIGHTS IN DIVIDED 
SOCIETIES 138 (2012). 
46. See, e.g., Committee on the Administration of Justice, A Bill of Rights for Northern 
Ireland: Through the years – the views of the political parties (2003), https://s3-eu-west-
1.amazonaws.com/caj.org.uk/2017/03/15130917/No.-46-A-Bill-of-Rights-for-Northern-
Ireland-Through-the-years-the-views-of-the-political-parties-July-2003.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/39VH-C2FG]. 
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their interests. In 1972 the UUP advocated a justiciable bill of rights; 
under the heading “Safeguards and Protection for Minorities” they 
stated that its enforcement “would be by the normal judicial remedies 
of injunction, mandamus and declaratory judgment . . .  rely[ing] on the 
existing Supreme Court of Northern Ireland”.47 The party proposed 
“the introduction of a precise and comprehensive Bill of Rights” and 
argued that although “they considerably restrict the powers of 
Government . . . the restriction of over wide legislative and executive 
action in these matters is an important safeguard”.48 Likewise, the 
DUP, while their preference was for a UK-wide bill of rights, stated 
that they “would be prepared to accept a proposal for a Northern Ireland 
bill of rights which would incorporate a range of statutory safeguards 
against abuse of power”.49 Arlene Foster has also commented on the 
need for unionists to reclaim the rights agenda.50 Furthermore, loyalist-
aligned parties, such as the Progressive Unionist Party (“PUP”) have 
supported the concept of a bill of rights, as they consider it to be a 
necessary component of peace in Northern Ireland: 
A Bill of Rights for all United Kingdom citizens should be drawn 
and ratified by the Westminster Parliament, guaranteed by the 
European Court of Human Rights and the United Nations 
Commission for Human Rights.51 
As noted earlier, this discussion illustrates that there is no such 
thing as one unionist vision of human rights; views have oscillated over 
the years. In contrast, nationalists/republicans have generally been 
more comfortable with the language of human rights, as historically the 
demand for enhanced protection has been associated with the 
nationalist parties, and to a lesser extent the Irish Government.52 
Nationalists/republicans view the state as party to the conflict, and the 
 
47. See UUP, Towards the Future: A Unionist Blueprint, in THE FUTURE OF NORTHERN 
IRELAND: A PAPER FOR DISCUSSION, Annex 4 (1972). 
48. Id. 
49. DUP, Ulster the Future Assured Proposals by the Ulster Democratic Unionist Party 
Northern Ireland Assembly Group for Progress Toward Full Devolution in Northern Ireland, 
12 (1984), https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/events/assembly1982/docs/dup200984.htm 
[https://perma.cc/J9RF-AYSV]. 
50. See Mark Devenport, Unionism must reclaim rights agenda says Arlene Foster, BBC 
NEWS (May 21, 2018), https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-politics-44198803 
[https://perma.cc/G96B-NA9H]. 
51. See COMM. ON THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR NORTHERN IRELAND: 
THROUGH THE YEARS – THE VIEWS OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES 10 (July 2003).  
52. See Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Human Rights in Negotiating Peace Agreements: The Good 
Friday Agreement 2 (The Intn’l Council on Hum. Rts. Pol’y, Working Paper, 2005). 
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discourse of human rights played a prominent role in constructions of 
the rule of law that seek to hold the state to account for its “actions or 
inaction”.53 Human rights discourse also had the advantage of 
“internationalizing” discussion of the conflict. As noted above, while 
unionist politicians have at times been uncomfortable, and are “reticent 
to use the language and framework of human rights”,54 it is often the 
opposite for nationalists/republicans. As Cahill-Ripley argues, “not 
surprisingly, historically with their involvement in the civil rights 
movement, the reframing of civil rights as human rights is a natural and 
easy transition for them to make”.55 Smithey suggests that the 
nomenclature of human rights was therefore considered to be 
“inappropriate under the totalizing and polarizing logic of 
ethnopolitical division. Once it was associated with nationalism, it was 
tainted”.56 A former PUP representative summed this up as: “rights are 
seen as a Catholic thing, it’s not a Protestant thing”.57 The Alliance 
Party commented as follows: 
the Bill of Rights . . .  has become toxic because nationalists have 
embraced it and unionists as a result are repelled by it . . . it’s not 
necessarily a logical extension of unionism to be against a Bill of 
Rights. So it’s hard to judge whether it’s . . . a position that they’ve 
taken because someone else is for it, then they’re against it, and 
that happens a lot in Northern Ireland.58 
What is particularly puzzling is the politicized perception of the 
use of “inclusive” language: these are intended to be human rights for 
“everyone”. But in an intriguing way the unionist critique also aligns 
with relativist criticisms of human rights discourse that view it as 
“liberal cover” for forms of politics, substituting “nationalist” for 
“liberal”. In Northern Ireland it also speaks to how political opponents 
are viewed, and the rival constructions of identity; a form of permanent 
“culture war” pervades society, underpinned by deep mistrust. The risk 
 
53. See Jane Winter, Abuses and Activism: The Role of Human Rights in the Northern 
Ireland Conflict and Peace Process, 1 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 8 (2013). 
54. Amanda Cahill-Ripley, Exploring The Local: Vernacularizing Economic and Social 
Rights for Peacebuilding within the Protestant/Unionist Borderland Community in Northern 
Ireland, 23(8) INT’L J. HUM. RTS., 1248, 1251 (2019). 
55. Id. 
56. LEE A. SMITHEY, UNIONISTS, LOYALISTS, AND CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION IN 
NORTHERN IRELAND 142 (2011). 
57. SMITH ET AL., supra note 3, at 44 (quoting a September 11, 2013 interview with Billy 
Hutchinson, PUP). 
58. Interview with Naomi Long, then MP, Alliance Party (Oct. 2, 2013) (on file with 
authors). 
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is that the value to be derived for all communities, through active 
engagement with rights discourse, is lost. 
V. BACKGROUND AND ORIGINS OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND 
BILL OF RIGHTS PROCESS 
A bill of rights has been on the political agenda from the 1960s 
onwards. From 1964 to 1968 there were four attempts by Sheelagh 
Murnaghan to introduce a bill of rights for Northern Ireland.59 
However, each effort failed to garner sufficient support amongst the 
Unionist parties, who were then dominant in the Stormont Parliament.60 
Some argue that had a bill of rights been enacted earlier in the 1960s as 
proposed by Murnaghan, it could have possibly prevented the outbreak 
of the conflict:61  
Had we [Northern Ireland] had a [Bill of Rights] in the 1960s 
whenever people like Sheelagh Murnaghan were advocating a Bill 
of Rights, we might have avoided some of the issues that exploded 
into the civil rights campaign and in particular socio-economic 
rights…one of the principle problems…was the allocution and 
distribution of housing and if we’d had them—[socio-economic 
rights] we might not have had that problem or we could have 
managed that problem differently…I say the same in relation to 
jobs.  If we had a human rights charter in relation to the area of job 
discrimination and equal opportunity, we could have perhaps 
avoided some of those problems because job discrimination was 
another aggravating factor that gave rise to the civil rights 
campaign and the Troubles ultimately.62 
The debate around a bill of rights took place consistently at key 
moments over the following decades. In the period from 1972–1998, 
there were times when proposals were routinely discussed. In 1972 the 
 
59. Constance Rynder, Sheelagh Murnaghan and the Ulster Liberal Party, 71 J. LIBERAL 
HIST. 15-16 (Summer 2011). 
60. Colin Harvey & Alex Schwartz, Designing a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland, 60 
N. IR. L.Q., 181 (2009); see id.  
61. Maurice Hayes, MINORITY VERDICT: EXPERIENCES OF A CATHOLIC PUBLIC SERVANT 
81 (1995) at 81. 
62. Smith et al., supra note 3, at 3 (quoting a May 1, 2013 interview with Alban 
Maginness, MLA SDLP). 
2020] DESIGNING BILLS OF RIGHTS 365 
Northern Ireland Parliament63 was dissolved after 50 years64 and 
replaced by direct rule from Westminster.65 The UK Government 
embarked on a series of consultations with the political parties in 
Northern Ireland to find an acceptable system of government. Each 
consultation proposed various forms of self-rule, alongside a bill of 
rights that could contribute to a stable system of government.66 
This constitutional debate continued into the mid-1980s, 
culminating in the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, which 
provided the Irish Government with a consultative role in the 
administration of Northern Ireland for the first time.67 The two main 
unionist parties opposed the intergovernmental agreement, and they 
subsequently refused to engage in government consultations. The 
1990s marked another round of internal debates within the parties 
relating to a bill of rights for Northern Ireland, within the context of 
devolution.68 Following the ceasefires, the British and Irish 
governments also commenced multi-party negotiations with the 
political parties.69 This resulted in the Agreement of April 1998, which, 
among other things, contained agreed power-sharing arrangements for 
a new Northern Ireland Legislative Assembly.70 This Assembly would 
 
63. The division of Ireland in 1921 resulted from an initial attempt to give “home rule” to 
the whole of Ireland (the 32 counties). The Irish Free State (consisting of 26 counties) came into 
existence in 1922 whilst the 6 counties of Ulster became “Northern Ireland” and remained under 
UK sovereignty with its own Parliament established the same year. This political move was 
opposed by Protestants in Ireland, who became the minority in the new Irish jurisdiction, as well 
as by a substantial Catholic minority within Northern Ireland whose identity was linked to the 
emerging Irish state. Thus, the polarization of the two communities was built from the inception 
of the state along religious and political lines. Religious affiliation thus came to define political 
identity and was the means by which the state characterized citizenship and loyalty. These 
incompatible objectives were broadly, on the one hand, the desire of the Catholic community 
for the political integration of Northern Ireland with the Irish Free State (1922-1948)/Irish 
Republic (1948 onwards) and, on the other, the wish of their Protestant counterparts for the 
territory and governance of the jurisdiction to remain the responsibility of the United Kingdom. 
64. See UUP, The Future of Northern Ireland: A Paper for Discussion, ¶12 (1972), 
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/hmso/nio1972.htm#part2 [https://perma.cc/FQU3-SPUX]. “The most 
striking feature of the executive government of Northern Ireland throughout this period of more 
than half a century was its virtually complete concentration in the hands of a single political 
party, the Ulster Unionist Party.” Id. 
65. See Northern Ireland (Temporary Provisions) Act (Northern Ireland) c. 22 1972 
(1972). 
66. SMITH ET AL., supra note 3, ch. 2. 
67. See Agreement between the Government of Ireland and the Government of the United 
Kingdom art. 2, 1985.  
68. SMITH ET AL., supra note 3, ch. 2. 
69. Id. 
70. It should be noted that the DUP did not support the Agreement. 
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act, along with the other institutions in Northern Ireland, in accordance 
with the “European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and any Bill 
of Rights”.71 The Agreement therefore provided a new “constitutional 
moment”72 for the introduction of a bill of rights. For some 
commentators,73 a bill of rights was essential: 
[W]hat system of human rights provision does this liberal 
consociation require? The answer most obviously is: a Bill of 
Rights and a legal system that is consistent with it. That in turn 
implies that each of the four elements of the consociational system 
must be appropriately protected where necessary.74 
The arguments on the merits of consociationalism will continue.75 But 
the debate about how to respect power-sharing and protect rights has 
had serious implications for the bill of rights process. 
 
71. See Agreement Between the Government of Ireland and the Government of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, ITS No. 1/2008 (Ir.) [hereinafter The 
Agreement]. This proposal is repeated four times in Strand One. Agreement reached in the multi-
party negotiations, Cm 3883 (1998) 37 ILM 751, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/136652/agreem
ent.pdf [https://perma.cc/JA3F-J35S] [hereinafter Agreement of April 1998]. 
72. This term is borrowed from Nolutshungu, who identified two essential elements within 
a constitutional idea: that of a constitutional moment and that of a constitutional function. The 
constitutional moment is the transition or the new beginning, which is more concerned with 
reaching a deal between the parties and the need to secure accommodation of all the parties’ 
interests rather than focusing on the constitutional function, the construction of a well-
functioning constitutional structure. See Anne Smith & Eithne MacLaughlin, Delivering 
Equality: Equality Mainstreaming and Constitutionalism of Socio-economic Rights, 61 N. IR. 
LEGAL Q. 93, 94 (citing S.C. Nolutshungu, The Constitutional Question in South Africa, in 
STATE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM: AN AFRICAN DEBATE ON DEMOCRACY (Issa G. Shivji ed., 
1991)). 
73. See, e.g., Brendan O’Leary, The Nature of the Agreement, 22 FORDHAM INT’L. L.J. 
1628 (1999). 
74. Brendan O’Leary, The Protection of Human Rights under the Belfast Agreement, 72(3) 
POL. Q. 353, 354 (2001). The term “consociation” or “consociationalism” was formulated by 
Lijphart to describe arrangements used in “deeply divided societies” involving institutionalized 
power-sharing arrangements between segments of society joined together by common 
citizenship but divided by language, religion, ethnicity or other factors. See Lijphart, supra note 
8. The four elements O’Leary refers to reflect Lijphart’s four criteria which constitute a 
consociational structure: segmental autonomy, a grand coalition of governing elites, 
proportional representation and mutual vetoes. 
75. Critics of consociationalism include: ASPECTS OF THE AGREEMENT (Rick Wilford ed., 
2001); Paul Dixon, NORTHERN IRELAND: THE POLITICS OF WAR AND PEACE (2002); Rupert 
Taylor, Consociation or Social Transformation?, in NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE DIVIDED 
WORLD: POST-AGREEMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (J. 
McGarry ed., 2001). 
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VI. THE AGREEMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 
In contrast to other jurisdictions that have adopted a bill of rights as 
part of what Bell calls a “constitutional design process”,76 the 
Agreement established a new and independent Commission to advise 
the UK Government, with the assumption that the proposals would then 
be enacted as Westminster legislation.77 The role was given to the new 
Commission, and this emphasis on “Westminster legislation” remains 
significant, as the chances of securing cross-party agreement in 
Northern Ireland were then, and still are, slim. The Agreement’s terms 
of reference provided that such a bill was to consist of rights 
supplementary to the ECHR and reflect the “particular circumstances 
of Northern Ireland”, among other things.78 Reference to the “particular 
circumstances of Northern Ireland” has featured heavily in the 
discussions, and continues to be a source of disagreement. What is 
particular to Northern Ireland, and what should this phrase be taken to 
mean? Even if it is accepted that the conflict is a major aspect of this, 
what are the precise consequences for the bill of rights? Does this lead 
to a narrow understanding of human rights protections or does it 
embrace a full range of guarantees? The responses to these questions 
have historically been informed by the relevant background 
understanding of human rights, and the approach taken to the conflict.79 
Nationalist and unionist responses reflect “wider political 
contestations”,80 with consequences for the adoption of any Northern 
Ireland bill of rights. 
Before examining these responses, it is worth underlining that 
although the phrase “particular circumstances of Northern Ireland” 
tends to dominate the conversation, it is one part only of the mandate. 
Of equal significance is the reference to “drawing as appropriate on 
international instruments and experience” and “rights supplementary to 
those in the European Convention on Human Rights”.81 These phrases 
suggest two points. First, a global perspective should also infuse the 
discussions, and it is plain (in the extensive levels of justification 
offered for the inclusion of each additional right supplementary to the 
 
76. Christine Bell, Introduction: Bargaining on Constitutions-Political Settlements and 
Constitutional State-Building, 6 GLOBAL CONST. 13, 14 (2017). 
77. See Agreement of April 1998, supra note 71, § 6 para. 4. 
78. Id. paras. 4, 16-17. 
79. For a discussion on these points, see Turner, supra note 4. 
80. Mallinder, supra note 2, at 11. 
81. Agreement of April 1998, supra note 71, § 6 para. 4. 
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ECHR) that the Commission attempted to do precisely that.82 Second, 
a Northern Ireland bill of rights would build on the rights protection 
provided by the “incorporated” ECHR rights under the Human Rights 
Act 1998 (“HRA”)83 and the Northern Ireland Act 1998.84 In other 
words, a bill would be HRA plus; the intention being to supplement the 
Act rather that repeal and replace it. The ECHR provides a minimum 
standard, a bill of rights ought to provide a higher level of rights 
protection and address potential gaps. For example, on children’s 
rights, the rights of minorities, socio-economic guarantees and 
communal rights. In a divided society such as Northern Ireland, the 
effective protection of communal rights in areas such as citizenship, 
culture, and identity is, for example, pivotal.85 
The idea that a bill of rights is the answer is not a universal view, 
either within the political sector or within academia.86 As stated earlier, 
we are not suggesting that the only way to protect rights is through a 
bill of rights; it is not. However, in the context of Northern Ireland it is 
an idea with profound normative merit, and the Agreement created a 
fair and reasonable expectation among participants in the peace process 
that one would be delivered. 
In taking forward this project the Commission employed an 
inclusive process and facilitated public participation. This was an 
attempt at a “bottom-up method of direct democracy” with the public 
asked in different fora to comment on draft consultations.87 Such an 
 
82. N. IR. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR NORTHERN IRELAND: 
ADVICE TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND app. 1 (Dec. 10, 2008), 
http://www.nihrc.org/uploads/publications/bill-of-rights-for-northern-ireland-advice-to-
secretary-state-2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/3BX4-6Q4Z]. 
83. This Act effectively made the ECHR part of UK domestic law. See Agreement of April 
1998, supra note 71, § 6 para. 4. 
84. This Act is the legislative enactment of the 1998 Agreement. Northern Ireland Act 
1998, C. 47 §§ 68-69 (UK), https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/47/contents 
[https://perma.cc/VL24-98XV]. 
85. Stephen Livingstone, The Need for a Bill of Rights in Northern Ireland, 52 N. IR. 
LEGAL Q. 269, 281 (2001).  
86. For example, Brice Dickson argues that while there is a need for human rights reform 
in Northern Ireland, the rights deficit can be addressed in other ways, and concludes that “a Bill 
of Rights is no longer the most efficient or effective way of achieving” human rights reform. 
Brice Dickson, The Stephen Livingstone Lecture: ‘The problems with human rights’, 70 N. IR. 
LEGAL Q. 467, 476 (2019). 
87. For a detailed discussion of the process, see Anne Smith & Leo Green, The Processes 
of the ‘unfinished businesses’ of the Good Friday/ Belfast Agreement: An all-island Charter of 
Rights and the Northern Ireland Bill of Rights, 11(2) IRISH YEARBOOK INT’L L. 23 (2016-2017). 
See also N. Ir. Human Rights Comm’n, Making a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland: A 
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approach is in line with what some view as a basic requirement for such 
a constitutional exercise. For example, Ginsberg and others state as 
bills of rights are generally the supreme law of the land, the processes 
require “the greatest possible level of legitimation in democratic 
theory”.88 Others have asserted that public participation can help 
“provide the citizenry with a sense of ownership and authorship, a 
sense that ‘We the people’ includes me”.89 In this context, bills of rights 
can be looked upon as citizen empowerment documents.90 However, in 
divided societies there is the added complication that it is often not “We 
the People” but “We the Peoples”.91 In Northern Ireland, while there 
has been a broad mass of cross-community support for a bill of rights,92 
as Schwartz and Harvey note, “it may be some time before the 
‘Peoples’ of Northern Ireland can come together to speak with a single 
sovereign voice”.93 
Notwithstanding that difficulty, Northern Ireland remains useful 
as an example of the impact of engagement on the Commission’s 
advice. As we have already stated, from the beginning (March 2000) 
the Commission embarked on an open and participative process, and 
received over 650 formal submissions from individuals and agencies.94 
As part of the process a Bill of Rights Forum (which included 
representation from all the main political parties in Northern Ireland 
 
Consultation by the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, CAIN ULSTER U. (Sept. 2001), 
https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/issues/law/bor/borconsult.htm [https://perma.cc/R3GH-X5AG]. 
88. Tom Ginsberg et al., Does the Process of Constitution-Making Matter?, 5 ANN. REV. 
L. & SOC. SCI. 201, 206 (2009). 
89. Hanna Lerner, MAKING CONSTITUTIONS IN DEEPLY DIVIDED SOCIETIES 18 
(Cambridge University Press 2013). The words “we the people” are drawn upon Ackerman’s 
writing on the subject. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. 
L. REV. 771 (1997); BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (Harvard University 
Press 1991). 
90. For a critical view, see Brian Christopher Jones, Constitutions and bills of rights: 
invigorating or placating democracy?, 38 LEGAL STUD. 339, 358-59 (2018) (arguing that rather 
than enhancing citizens’ power, Bills of Rights can reduce citizens’ influence as power is 
transferred to either the judiciary or the elected representatives). 
91. Stephen Tierney, We the Peoples: Balancing Constituent Power and Constitutionalism 
on Plurinational States, in THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 229 (Neil Walker & Martin 
Loughlin eds., 2007). 
92. Attitudes to Human Rights in Northern Ireland: Polling Data, HUM. RTS. 
CONSORTIUM (July 2017), http://www.humanrightsconsortium.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/07/Attitudes-to-Human-Rights-in-Northern-Ireland-Polling-Data-1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S4SF-KBSJ]. 
93. Harvey & Schwartz, supra note 60, at 148. 
94. N. IR. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, supra note 82. 
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and various sections of civic society) was created in 2006.95 Although 
it did not achieve agreement on a single set of proposals,96 the 
Commission welcomed the Forum’s findings, and agreed to pay 
“rigorous attention to the proposals contained in the Forum Report, 
with each of its proposals considered in detail”.97 On receipt of the 
Forum’s advice, the Commission publicly stated its intention to submit 
its advice on a bill of rights to the Secretary of State for Northern 
Ireland within a defined time frame.98 Having met its self-imposed 
deadline, the Commission’s advice was published on December 10, 
2008.99 
VII. DELIVERING AT LAST: THE COMMISSION’S ADVICE 
The Commission did not set out a draft bill of rights, but rather 
the advice took the form of a comprehensive report with detailed 
recommendations on what rights should be included, and the rationale 
for the inclusion of each specific right. The Commission adopted 
guidelines which explained each recommendation and explained, in 
considerable detail, how it had approached the task.100 The scale and 
extent of the advice hints at the level of contestation around the process, 
and the length that the Commission went to be open and rigorous. The 
attempt to work within a specific methodological framework is notable, 
as one of the first and obvious problems for the drafters of bills of rights 
in deeply divided societies is deciding what rights should be enacted, 
and how the selection will be justified. Other questions include: should 
a bill of rights contain a universal package of rights for any society that 
“goes beyond the confines of the conflict?”101 Or should it be an 
 
95. The origins of the Bill of Rights Forum flow from the Joint Declaration by the British 
and Irish Governments, Ir.-Eng., April 2003, Annex 3, ¶3. However, the Bill of Rights was 
formally established following the St. Andrews Agreement 2006. 
96. See generally BILL OF RIGHTS FORUM, FINAL REPORT: RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE 
NORTHERN IRELAND HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION ON A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR NORTHERN 
IRELAND (Mar. 31, 2009). The key areas of disagreement were what constituted the ‘particular 
circumstances’ of Northern Ireland; cultural and identity rights; and social and economic rights. 
Id. at 70, 73, 86, 102. 
97. N. IR. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, supra note 82, at 13. 
98. Id. at 13. 
99. Id. at 1. 
100. Id. Appendix 1. 
101. Grech, supra note 42, at 252. For example, the suggestion that the original intention 
was for incorporation of the ECHR with some “add-ons” connected to the particular 
circumstances of Northern Ireland. See MIKE CHINOY, ARE YOU WITH ME?: KEVIN BOYLE AND 
THE RISE OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT 301 (The Lilliput Press, 2020). 
2020] DESIGNING BILLS OF RIGHTS 371 
“indigenous” bill of rights reflecting the particular needs of a deeply 
divided society? Should it be fully justiciable, entrenching a wide range 
of rights, including socio-economic rights? Issues of enforcement, 
derogation and implementation also need to be addressed, as does the 
question of scope—should such a bill have horizontal as well as vertical 
application? 
Responding to the Agreement’s reference to the realization of a 
higher level of rights protection than afforded by the ECHR 
provisions,102 the advice includes economic, social and cultural rights, 
along with a number of other rights, which it considered would reflect 
the “particular circumstances of Northern Ireland”.103 The Commission 
took the position that all the recommendations should be capable of 
judicial enforcement.104 It also adopted several recommendations that 
acknowledged the need for effective dialogue between the different 
“branches of government”, including annual reporting to the Northern 
Ireland Assembly and the Westminster Parliament on progress, as well 
as the establishment of a Human Rights Committee in the Assembly 
and a five-year independent review.105 The Commission recommended 
that the bill would apply to both the Assembly and the Executive and 
have vertical as well as horizontal application.106 
The Commission’s blended approach has merit, in that a bill of 
rights should contain what might be termed “universal standards” as 
well as those provisions that are needed if it is to be anchored in the 
particular circumstances of society.107 As Harvey argues “[a] bill of 
rights that is not properly grounded will have an insecure future and 
risks irrelevance. There is a balance to be struck, in navigating abstract 
 
102. Michael Meehan, Towards a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights, 23 LIVERPOOL L. REV. 
33, 41-42 (2001). 
103. Agreement of April 1998, supra note 71, § 6 para. 4. The recommendations include: 
the right to life; right to liberty and security, right to a fair trial and no punishment without trial; 
right to marriage or civil partnership; right to equality and prohibition of discrimination; 
democratic rights; education rights; freedom of movement; freedom from violence, exploitation 
and harassment; right to identity and culture; language rights; rights of victims; right to civil and 
administrative justice; right to health; right to an adequate standard of living; right to 
accommodation; right to work; environmental rights; social security rights; children’s rights. Id. 
104. N. IR. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, supra note 82, at 59.  
105. Id. 
106. Id. at 148-70. 
107. It should be noted here that one of the Authors (Harvey) was a commissioner at the 
time. 
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universalism and cultural relativism”.108 At the same time we are 
cognizant that achieving this balance can be challenging, especially 
where there is a lack of agreement, both about what rights are 
considered so fundamental that they should be in a bill of rights, and 
the differing visions of human rights between the main political 
protagonists. The political responses to the Commission’s advice 
epitomize this difficulty. 
VIII. CONTESTATION REVISITED: RESPONSES TO THE 
COMMISSION’S ADVICE 
In its response to the advice, the Northern Ireland Office (“NIO”) 
in 2009 adopted a minimalist approach,109 arguing that most of the 
rights proposed by the Commission were already adequately protected 
by existing legislation, policy, or practice,110 or were not specific to 
Northern Ireland. In addition, the NIO sought to append these rights to 
a “national” discussion on a possible UK bill of rights.111 The 
insensitivity of the response was not surprising, and ignores this apt 
advice: 
Northern Ireland is not Lincolnshire or Somerset. It is a distinct 
and unique political entity, recognised as such by an international 
treaty registered with the United Nations: the Belfast Agreement 
of 1998.112 
In line with the peace agreement, the Northern Ireland bill of rights is, 
and should continue to be, a separate process, independent of and 
unfettered by the UK debate about a “British” bill of rights.113 The UK 
Commission on a Bill of Rights114 reached the same conclusion: 
 
108. Colin Harvey & David Russell, A new beginning for human rights protection in 
Northern Ireland?, 6 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 748, 753 (2009). 
109. The NIO’s response supported the inclusion of only two out of the seventy-eight 
recommendations put forward by Commission. These are the right to vote/be elected and the 
right to identify and be accepted as British or Irish or both. See N. Ir. Office, A Bill of Rights for 
Northern Ireland: Next Steps, 1, 42 (November 2009). 
110. Id. at 72. 
111. These rights include right to marriage or civil partnership, education rights, freedom 
of movement, right to civil and administrative justice, right to health, right to an adequate 
standard of living, right to work, environmental rights and social security rights. Id. at 17.  
112. Fintan O’Toole, Belfast agreement is a threat to the new English nationalism, IRISH 
TIMES (July 5, 2016), http://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/fintan-o-toole-belfast-agreement-is-a-
threat-to-the-new-english-nationalism-1.2710209 [https://perma.cc/A9WW-AJTV]. 
113. For further information, see Harvey, supra note 5. 
114. The UK Bill of Rights Commission was established in March 2011 by the coalition 
government in response to the Conservative Party’s wish to dilute the Human Rights Act and 
2020] DESIGNING BILLS OF RIGHTS 373 
We [the Commission] recognise the distinctive Northern Ireland 
Bill of Rights process and its importance to the peace process in 
Northern Ireland. We do not wish to interfere in that process in any 
way nor for any of the conclusions that we reach to be interpreted 
or used in such a way as to interfere in, or delay, the Northern 
Ireland Bill of Rights process.115 
The NIO’s critical response chimed with that of the main unionist 
parties, most notably the UUP and the DUP.116 They argued that the 
Commission should have adopted a narrower interpretation of its 
mandate and suggested that it went beyond its designated role.117 This 
stance is illustrative of the minimalist and “court sceptic” narrative 
discussed earlier, as well as a view of what was originally intended: 
The agreement mandated the commission to engage in a modest 
task, not one of industrial proportions. The commission was 
merely invited to consult and advise on the scope for 
supplementary rights, nothing more. It was not mandated to devise 
a new bill of rights or to change our socio-economic context 
through the creation of numerous new rights; it was merely 
mandated to examine the scope for rights supplementary to the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Quite how we got from 
that very modest, realistic task to a 189-page document from the 
Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission that proposes to hand 
over significant sections of public policy to the courts—taking 
them from democratically elected representatives—is something 
of a mystery.118 
 
the Liberal Democrat’s wish to maintain it. The Commission failed to reach an agreement on 
whether or not the UK should have its own bill of rights. Commission on a Bill of Rights, A UK 
Bill of Rights? The Choice Before Us, COMM’N ON A BILL OF RIGHTS, Vol. 1 (Dec. 2012), 
https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130206065653/https://www.justice.gov.uk/down
loads/about/cbr/uk-bill-rights-vol-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/QN2M-ZTNS]. 
115. Id. ¶12.4. 
116. Democratic Unionist Party, A Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland: Next Steps – 
Response by Democratic Unionist Party (Mar. 2010); Ulster Unionist Party, Ulster Unionist 
Party consultation response – The Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland, Next Steps (Mar. 2010) 
(on file with authors). 
117. Colin Harvey, Where now for the Northern Ireland Bill of Rights Process?, UK 
CONST. L. ASS’N (July 28, 2011), http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2011/07/28/colin-harvey-
where-now-for-the-northern-ireland-bill-of-rights-process/ [https://perma.cc/VX5K-C78W]. 
Two out of the ten commissioners dissented from the final advice; they were Mr. Jonathan Bell 
and Lady Daphne Trimble. 
118. Mr. Kennedy, Before Northern Ireland Assembly, Private Members’ Business: 
Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission (Nov. 3, 2009), 
http://archive.niassembly.gov.uk/record/reports2009/091103.pdf [https://perma.cc/72X3-
2E3J]. 
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In contrast, the PUP argued that the NIO’s “document presented 
for consultation does not reflect the feedback, demands and needs of 
the process managed by the NIHRC and with the other parties it urged 
for the NIO to re-consider its proposals”.119 The party further reiterated 
its support for a strong bill of rights that would include social and 
economic rights.120 Their stance was also supported by 
nationalist/republican parties, the Alliance Party and NGOs, 
community groups, trade unions and other civil society organizations 
(some of these organizations were reflecting views from within 
Protestant/unionist communities)121 who favored the Commission’s 
interpretation of its mandate, and agreed that it was intended to be 
inclusive.122 They endorsed the Commission’s generous approach.123 
These two schools of thought (the restrictive versus the purposive) 
illustrate that the process, since inception, has been marked by a lack 
of political consensus framed by differing views of the original 
intentions of the drafters and the role of any bill of rights. While there 
is cross-community support for a Northern Ireland bill of rights (as 
evidenced by several opinion polls)124 the lack of “elite political”125 
backing remains the key obstacle to progress. As Harvey and Schwartz 
state, “Northern Ireland would already have a bill of rights (in some 
form or another) if only its political elites really wanted one”.126 That 
remains a basic fact of the process, allied to the reality that successive 
UK governments have used the absence of cross-party agreement as a 
basis for refusing to legislate at Westminster.127 
The findings of our research project suggest that there is also a 
third school of thought: some NGOs think that the Commission’s 
advice did not go far enough, and could be strengthened.128 In this 
 
119. Letter from the Progressive Unionist Party to Shaun Woodward Secretary of State 
for Northern Ireland, Mar. 9, 2010 (on file with the authors). 
120. Id. 
121. Harvey & Schwartz, supra note 45, at 138. 
122. N. Ir. Human Rights Comm’n, Summary of Submissions on a Bill of Rights (July 
2003), at 19 (on file with authors). 
123. For a detailed discussion about the response to both the Commission’s advice and the 
NIO, see SMITH ET AL., supra note 3, ch. 3. 
124. N. IR. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, supra note 82, at 8. 
125. Harvey & Schwartz, supra note 45 at 130. 
126. Id. 
127. SMITH ET AL., supra note 3, at 45. 
128. These organizations included: The Family Planning Association, the Children’s Law 
Centre; Anti-Poverty Network, Disability Forum and the Committee on the Administration of 
Justice. As part of the project, we translated the Commission’s advice into a draft legislative 
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context, it is worth noting that the Commission’s 2008 advice was itself 
a compromise document; it did not include everything that, for 
example, civil society organizations wanted. This point is neglected in 
the public discussion, with a tendency to prioritize the voices of those 
who favor narrower options. This imbalance created space for the 
Commission’s advice to be cast in clichéd terms, and thus gave 
excessive room for the input of those who simply sought to avoid 
engagement on content. 
The established “two-communities” construction of the debate 
therefore clouded and obscured the views of those who argued that the 
advice never went far enough. In practice the hegemonic (conservative) 
narratives that tend to dominate public life in Northern Ireland ensured 
that the Commission’s advice could be written off as unrealistic. It joins 
a long list of contributions to public debate in Northern Ireland that are 
much commented on but little read. 
Respondents to our project helped to clarify the areas where 
further thought might be needed. These include: marriage equality; 
women’s rights and reproductive rights; language rights; equality and, 
in particular, the rights of disabled people. In addition, more specific 
recommendations emerged on the rights of children and young people; 
the rights of refugees (in particular, refugee and unaccompanied 
asylum-seeking children); and the ongoing systemic neglect of socio-
economic rights.129 Advances in some of these areas, most notably 
marriage equality and reproductive rights, continue to be made 
alongside the conversation on a bill of rights.130 Campaigns on 
marriage equality and reproductive rights had notable successes (via 
the Westminster Parliament) in 2019.131 However, these advances do 
 
model bill of rights. See Smith & Harvey supra note 5, at 3. During the project the Authors also 
held stakeholder events in Belfast (June 28, 2017, and December 14, 2017) and in Derry 
(November 29, 2017) asking for responses to the draft model bill of rights. 
129. Id. 
130. See The Northern Ireland Executive Formation Act 2019 ch. 8-9. Other examples 
where Northern Ireland has benefited from legislation passed at Westminster include the Gender 
Recognition Act 2004, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, and the Data 
Protection Act 2018. Restoration of devolution was formally established in January 2020 on the 
basis of the New Decade, New Approach agreement. See New Decade, New Approach, Ir.-U.K, 
Jan. 2020, available at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/f
ile/856998/2020-01-08_a_new_decade__a_new_approach.pdf [https://perma.cc/4J57-6WKR]. 
131. Law Liberalising Abortion and Same-Sex Marriage In NI Passes Final Stage, IRISH 
TIMES (July 22, 2019), https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/law-liberalising-
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not necessarily eradicate the need for inclusion in a bill of rights. As 
noted earlier, a bill of rights can supplement and complement existing 
legislation, and provide a useful overarching normative framework.132 
While much of the Commission’s advice reflects its designated 
mandate, it was submitted 12 years ago. As such, it could be usefully 
augmented to reflect the changing “particular circumstances of 
Northern Ireland”. Brexit, in particular, dominated the responses to our 
project, and was highlighted as a major threat to the Agreement.133 It 
has fueled widespread anxiety about the future, and the impact on 
existing guarantees.134 The loss of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights was much commented on,135 and has also been questioned by, 
among others, the UN Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and 
human rights.136 There will be question marks over the extent and the 
delivery of a wide range of rights. Most notably equality rights and 
employment rights, such as on unfair dismissal and safe working 
conditions. There are also concerns about the implications for socio-
economic rights, such as access to health care, social and housing 
assistance, as well as protections relating to personal data and the right 
to an effective judicial remedy.137 
Citizenship rights and national identity were also highlighted as 
areas that will be affected by Brexit.138 The Agreement, for example, 
recognizes the right of the people of Northern Ireland to identify 
 
abortion-and-same-sex-marriage-in-ni-passes-final-stage-1.3964062 [https://perma.cc/R7EP-
72NU]. 
132. Asmal, supra note 10. 
133. Oral feedback from the stakeholder events in Belfast (June 28, 2017 and  Dec. 14, 
2017); Derry (Nov. 29, 2017) (on file with the authors). 
134. For example, see the work and outputs of the BrexitLawNI project. BREXITLAWNI, 
https://www.brexitlawni.org [https://perma.cc/C77D-EEX2] (last visited Dec. 2, 2020). 
135. Oral feedback from the stakeholder events in Belfast (June 28, 2017 and  Dec. 14, 
2017); Derry (Nov. 29, 2017) (on file with the authors); See also European Union (Withdrawal) 
Act 2018, sch. 5(4) (Eng.). 
136. See U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, Statement on 
Visit to the United Kingdom (Nov. 16, 2018), 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Poverty/EOM_GB_16Nov2018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/72DV-PYMZ] (“If the European Charter of Fundamental Rights becomes no 
longer applicable in the UK, the level of human rights protections enjoyed by the population 
will be significantly diminished. The UK should not roll back EU-derived human rights 
protections on workplace regulation and inequality”.). 
137. For an excellent discussion of the impact of the EU Charter in the UK, see Menelaos 
Markakis, Brexit and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, PUB. LAW: THE CONSTITUTION 
& ADMIN. LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH, 82, 82 (2019). 
138. Oral feedback from the stakeholder events in Belfast (June 28, 2017 and  Dec. 14, 
2017); Derry (Nov. 29, 2017) (on file with the authors). 
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themselves and be accepted as Irish or British (or both), a right that 
“would not be affected by any future change in the status of Northern 
Ireland”.139 Furthermore, when the Agreement was signed, there was a 
background assumption that the UK and Ireland would remain Member 
States of the EU. Indeed, one of the purposes of the Agreement was 
declared to be that both governments wished: “To develop still further 
the unique relationship between their peoples and the close co-
operation between their countries as friendly neighbours and as 
partners in the European Union”.140 
Brexit means that one of the “partners” is a “third country”, and 
although a special arrangement is in place (Protocol on 
Ireland/Northern Ireland),141 this will bring a major change in status for 
Northern Ireland. The question therefore arises how this will impact, 
for example, the future protection of citizenship provisions outlined in 
the Agreement, and commitments to human rights and equality. In this 
context, in order to uphold and respect the Agreement, it was a firmly 
expressed view throughout our project that the bill of rights should now 
be revisited142 as a potential solution to the rights and equality 
challenges presented by Brexit.143 Indeed, the basic purpose of a bill of 
rights is precisely to safeguard the Agreement. In particular, and in 
relation to Brexit, the following rights/issues were highlighted by 
participants in our project: citizenship equality144; freedom of 
 
139. The Agreement, supra note 71, art. 1(vi). 
140. Agreement between the Government of Ireland and the Government of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Ir.-U.K., Dec. 2, 1999, Irish Treaty Series 2000 
N 18, 
https://www.dfa.ie/media/dfa/alldfawebsitemedia/treatyseries/uploads/documents/treaties/docs
/200018.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VRV-J6TV]. 
141. Council Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Committee, Jan. 
31, 2020, 2020 O.J. L 29, Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:12020W/TXT#d1e32-102-1 [https://perma.cc/EA2D-F3DJ]. 
142. Smith & Harvey, supra note 5. 
143. Several organizations noted that the bill of rights may now take “centre stage” in the 
context of Brexit. These included: UNISON, the Committee on the Administration of Justice, 
and Amnesty International. Oral feedback from the stakeholder events in Belfast (June 28, 2017 
and  Dec. 14, 2017); (on file with the authors) 
144. The question of citizenship was raised in the recent DeSouza case. Emma DeSouza, 
an Irish citizen, born in Northern Ireland, applied to the Home Office for a residence card for 
her US-born husband. This was rejected by the Home Office, as UK nationality law held that 
people born in Northern Ireland remained British under the law, even if they identify as Irish, 
unless they expressly renounced their British citizenship. Ms. DeSouza argued that she never 
considered herself as British and there was no need to renounce it, having always identified as 
Irish. Using Article 1(vi) of the Agreement (this entitles people born in Northern Ireland to 
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movement; equivalence of rights on the island of Ireland; EU 
citizenship rights; and voting rights.145 
So how could a bill of rights address these matters? Regarding 
citizenship equality and EU citizenship rights, Brexit will create two 
classes of citizenship. Those persons holding only British citizenship, 
and who do not otherwise benefit from EU law guarantees, will no 
longer be able to exercise EU-treaty rights such as freedom of 
movement in the EU to work, study, and reside, with the associated 
right to be free of discrimination on the grounds of nationality. Irish 
citizens will continue to be EU citizens with the right to move freely to 
and within the EU and live and work there without discrimination, 
British citizens will not. This poses a dilemma for the good faith 
implementation of the Agreement. To force people to choose one 
citizenship or another in order to access different rights is arguably 
contrary to Article 1(vi) of the Agreement (the national identity 
provision), as discussed above.146 It is notable in this context that the 
Commission’s advice states: 
The right of the people of Northern Ireland to hold British or Irish 
citizenship or both in accordance with the laws governing the 
exercise of this right, with no detriment or differential treatment of 
any kind. This right would not be affected by any future change in 
the status of Northern Ireland.147 
A leading human rights NGO, responding to our project, recommended 
that the NIHRC’s advice could be augmented as below: 
The right of the people of Northern Ireland to hold British or Irish 
citizenship or both in accordance with the laws governing the 
exercise of this right, with no detriment or differential treatment of 
any kind. It shall be the duty of the UK Government, through 
 
identify as British or Irish or both) Ms. DeSouza challenged the UK’s immigration rules, arguing 
that they conflicted with the Agreement’s identity and citizenship provisions. Appealing against 
the decision of the First-tier Tribunal which found in favour of Ms. DeSouza, the Secretary of 
State for Northern Ireland won his appeal in the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum 
Chamber). See Secretary of State for the Home Department v. DeSouza [2019] UKUT 355. 
Following a change to the immigration rules, Ms. DeSouza withdrew an application to appeal 
to the Court of Appeal of Northern Ireland. For a useful analysis of the questions of citizenship 
and identity, see Comm. on the Admin. of Justice, Initial thoughts on rights and the New Decade, 
New Approach (NDNA) agreement (S485) Briefing Note (Jan. 2020), at 5-6, https://s3-eu-west-
1.amazonaws.com/caj.org.uk/2020/02/04151315/Initial-thoughts-on-NDNA.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Y6WR-MDJW]. 
145. Smith & Harvey, supra note 5. 
146. Agreement of April 1998, supra note 71. 
147. N. IR. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, supra note 82, at 41 (emphasis added). 
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legislation and agreement as possible, to ensure full and effective 
equality of the rights accruing to the two forms of citizenship. This 
right would not be affected by any future change in the status of 
Northern Ireland.148 
The same organization recommended that a provision should be drafted 
“to ensure that all EU citizens have the right to enter and leave Northern 
Ireland without let or hindrance, the right to reside indefinitely and 
work in Northern Ireland and any other rights currently enjoyed by EU 
citizens under EU Treaties on the territory of the UK as may be 
practically possible”. 149 
Although the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland150 (which is 
enacted in domestic law via the European Union (Withdrawal 
Agreement) Act 2020) guarantees what McCrudden calls the “general 
clause”151 of “no diminution of rights” set out in the relevant sections 
of the Agreement, and a “more specific anti-discrimination clause”,152 
the Annex only includes what McCrudden describes as “anti-
discrimination Directives”.153 While this is to be welcomed, as Murray 
and others argue, “it is a long way short of comprehensive and dynamic 
non diminution of the broad range of EU rights protections suggested 
by the Joint Report”.154 Furthermore, as McCrudden points out, there 
are a series of other important EU Directives that are not included, such 
 
148. Comm. on the  Admin. of Justice, Draft Submission on the Bill of Rights to the 
“Conversation” Project (Sept. 2017) (on file with the authors). 
149. Id. 
150. Council Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Committee, Jan. 31, 
2020, 2020 O.J. L 29; Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:12020W/TXT#d1e32-102-1 [https://perma.cc/65T4-ASHS]. 
151. Christopher McCrudden, Brexit, rights and the Northern Ireland Protocol to the 
Withdrawal Agreement, BRIT. ACAD. & ROYAL IRISH ACAD 16 (2018), 
https://www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk/documents/298/europe-futures-brexit-rights-ireland-
northern-ireland-protocol-withdrawal-agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/SVD5-KK38]. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. at 23. 
154. Sylvia de Mars et al., Continuing EU Citizenship “Rights, Opportunities and 
Benefits” in Northern Ireland after Brexit, N. IR. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N & IRISH EQUALITY 
& HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N 42 (Mar. 2020), 
https://www.nihrc.org/uploads/publications/Rights_Opportunities.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PYE-
LCBR]. In December 2017, the UK and the EU published a joint report on the progress of phase 
one of the Brexit negotiations. See, e.g., Joint report from the negotiators of the European 
Union and the United Kingdom government on progress during phase 1 of negotiations 
under article 50 TEU on the United Kingdom’s orderly withdrawal from the European 
Union (Dec. 8, 2017), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-
political/files/joint_report.pdf https://perma.cc/4H7T-5XHF. 
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as the Part-time Work Directive, the Maternity and Parental Leave 
Directive and the Pregnancy Directive.155 Thus a bill of rights, as 
Murray and others argue, remains the “best means”156 of addressing 
these gaps. 
The possible impact of Brexit also features prominently in the 
latest agreement to restore power-sharing government.157 There are two 
notable points about the wording. First, it represents an advance on the 
previous position. Before this, the process had stalled to the extent that 
the Stormont House Agreement simply noted that consensus was 
absent, with vague aspirations about the values that would continue to 
inform political developments.158 However, under the heading Rights, 
language and identity there is reference to an ad hoc Assembly 
Committee.159 This Committee has been established and, for the first 
time in over a decade, there is a formal process for taking forward this 
work.160 Second, the wording generally reflects the language used in a 
leaked draft Agreement between Sinn Féin and the DUP in February 
2018,161 which aimed, albeit unsuccessfully, to achieve a return to 
government.162 Similar to the language of the 2018 leaked document, 
the 2020 deal states that the Committee is to “consider the creation of 
a Bill of Rights that is faithful to the stated intention of the 1998 
Agreement”, and the references (from the Agreement) to 
supplementing the ECHR and the particular circumstances of Northern 
Ireland are singled out.163 
 
155. McCrudden, supra note 151, at 24. 
156. See de Mars et al., supra note 154, at 45. 
157. New Decade, New Approach, supra note 130. 
158. N. Ir. Office, The Stormont House Agreement, GOV.UK, 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/f
ile/390672/Stormont_House_Agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VBT-FXG9] (last visited Apr. 
5, 2020) (the Stormont House Agreement was reached with Northern Ireland’s political leaders 
and the British and Irish governments in December 2014 to deal with a range of issues including 
the legacy of the conflict. The bill of rights was mentioned in paragraph 69). 
159. New Decade, New Approach, supra note 130, at 16. 
160. See N. Ir. Assembly, Ad Hoc Committee on a Bill of Rights, Minutes of Proceedings 
2019-2020, http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/assembly-business/committees/2017-2022/ad-hoc-
committee-on-a-bill-of-rights/ [https://perma.cc/8S5T-F2DH] (last visited July 16, 2020). 
161. Full ‘Draft Agreement Text, EAMONNMALLIE (Feb. 20, 2018), 
http://eamonnmallie.com/2018/02/full-draft-agreement-text/ [https://perma.cc/8JXU-NPJV]. 
162. See Anne Smith & Colin Harvey, The Return of the Bill of Rights?, RIGHTSNI (Mar. 
29, 2018), http://rightsni.org/2018/03/the-return-of-the-bill-of-rights/ [https://perma.cc/2JNL-
LX6N]. 
163. New Decade, New Approach, supra note 130, at 16. 
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The language of international instruments and experience is 
missing, and this may or may not be a telling absence. This Committee 
will be assisted by an expert Panel of five persons appointed jointly by 
the First Minister and deputy First Minister.164 If there was any doubt 
about how central the “particular circumstances” phrase is, it is 
dispelled here. The first job of the Panel is to advise the Committee on 
“what constitutes ‘our particular circumstances’”.165 In this it is to 
“draw upon, but not be bound by, previous work on a Bill of Rights”.166 
There is reference to the “UK’s withdrawal from the EU”167 and the 
need for recommendations on how this will impact “particular 
circumstances”.168 This would, presumably, now be taken to refer to 
the implications of Brexit for the bill of rights. Importantly and perhaps 
“most concerning”169 given the context is that the section ends by 
highlighting that “cross party and cross community support”170 are vital 
for any progress. This was not included in the 2018 draft document nor 
in the Agreement itself. 
There are several points to note about the current state of this 
process. First, there is now a clear role for an ad hoc Committee of the 
Northern Ireland Assembly in assessing the position and charting a way 
forward. This inserts a new step in the bill of rights process, one that is 
not envisaged in the Agreement. It is clear in the Agreement that the 
next stage (after the Commission’s advice) was to be Westminster 
legislation. 
Second, it is not apparent from the text what the precise role of 
the Committee will be and how the relationship with the expert panel 
will be managed. For example, will this Committee simply be 
providing an update or will it be making concrete recommendations for 
ways forward? If it does produce a report, what might happen next? 
Does this introduce into the bill of rights debate the prospect of 
Assembly legislation or will this then be taken forward at Westminster? 
Third, the role of the advisory expert Panel is intriguing. This is 
to be an “expert” body of five persons appointed jointly by two 
executive ministers (First and deputy First Ministers), but offering 
 
164. Full ‘Draft Agreement Text’, supra note 161 (in the draft leaked document from 2018, 
it was a panel of four). 
165. New Decade, New Approach, supra note 130, Annex E. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. 
168. Id. 
169. Committee on the Administration of Justice, Initial Thoughts, supra note 144. 
170. New Decade, New Approach, supra note 130, Annex E. 
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advice to a committee of the legislature.171 What happens, for example, 
if members of the panel disagree? What will be done if established 
divisions simply re-emerge in this Committee, and it is just another 
venue in which to play out familiar conflicts, further dividing an 
already divided society? In short, could the Committee be yet another 
manifestation of “more of the same”?172 Questions will also arise over 
the process of appointments and what the remit will be.173 For example, 
will the Panel have an outreach and engagement role or will it be 
confined to providing technical and other forms of legal advice? 
Fourth, there is an overriding reference to the “stated intention” 
of the 1998 Agreement. One of the challenges for this Committee, and 
for the Panel, is the absence of consensus on precisely what this means. 
Again, there is a real risk that this process will simply confirm what is 
already well known about the process. The Panel advice to the 
Committee may help, but the existing disagreements over a bill of 
rights will remain (in terms of Committee membership). 
Fifth, the provision allows the Committee and Panel to examine 
and draw upon all the work done thus far.174 There is much to consider. 
The difficulty is that this might be read as undermining the advice 
submitted by the Commission, and neglects the fact that formally this 
stage of the process has in fact been completed. This must, however, 
be read alongside the reference to the primacy of the intention of the 
1998 Agreement. It would be difficult for the Panel or Committee to 
ignore the Commission’s advice given this specific focus. 
Sixth, subjecting progress on a bill of rights to “cross party and 
cross community support” departs from the Agreement. While the UK 
Government has previously insisted that “it would be virtually 
impossible to adopt a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland without 
extensive cross-party support,”175 the Irish Government has never 
publicly adopted such a position. 
 
171. Id. 
172. Whitaker, supra note 7, at 37. 
173. The Human Rights Consortium in Northern Ireland wrote to the Executive Office 
requesting details on the appointment process of the Panel of Experts. Potential candidates were 
directly approached and were identified not by open trawl, but by suggestions from the 
Departmental Solicitor’s Office and the Human Rights Commission. Correspondence with the 
Human Rights Consortium (June 2020) (on file with authors). 
174. New Decade, New Approach, supra note 130, at 37.  
175. Theresa Villiers, former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, 566 Parl Deb HC 
(2013) col. 197WH (UK). 
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Furthermore, it is surprising that the parties agreed to endorse this 
approach, as in September 2011 the then Secretary of State for 
Northern Ireland issued a letter to each of the political parties 
suggesting the possibility of the Assembly being empowered to take 
forward this work.176 At that time the parties did not express any 
interest in pursuing this, and as far as we can ascertain, none of the 
parties responded to the NIO correspondence.177 Some parties did, 
however, signal their concern at this proposal (to devolve the 
discussions) noting that parties consistently exercise a veto in the 
Northern Ireland Assembly.178 The level of political disagreement is 
evident in all the Assembly debates on a bill of rights thus far.179 As the 
Alliance Party noted, “our system of government provides vetoes for 
the largest parties on either side of the divide and it’s always easier to 
veto change than to veto no change.”180 
Respondents also noted this absence of consensus amongst the 
two main parties in government. For example, the former leader of the 
Alliance Party argued “unless the largest party was in favour it could 
still be blocked . . . . The decisions are those that are worked out by the 
DUP and Sinn Féin at Executive level . . . and worked out by the First 
Minister’s team and the deputy First Minister’s team in Stormont 
Castle.”181 The Green Party also believed, “there’s the politically 
sensitive stuff . . . things go into OFMdFM and they don’t come out.”182 
As the former leader of the Alliance Party stated: 
there are lots of things which are devolved which are in deadlock 
at the moment, including things which are critical . . . I’m really 
not sure if [devolving it] has any real chance of making a 
difference.183 
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to the leaders of the Northern Ireland Political Parties, received by the Northern Ireland 
Assembly (Sept. 22, 2011) (on file with authors). 
177. SMITH ET AL., supra note 3, at 7. 
178. Id. at 46. 
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with authors). 
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Ivan Lewis MP, the then Shadow Spokesperson on Northern Ireland 
for the Labour Party, noted that although devolution requires that the 
Executive take the lead: 
there has been no progress historically, in the peace process at very 
difficult stages without the active engagement of the two 
governments very much working together as one. And I think that 
that is absolutely crucial.184 
Given this context, there is a real danger that this current process could 
result in parties merely “updating [their] positions and being back in 
the same place”.185 
Finally, the text shows awareness of the possible impact of Brexit, 
and this is to be welcomed. This is a new ingredient that must now 
inform the way forward. Any proposals for a bill of rights will need to 
be shaped fully by the implications of the UK’s withdrawal from the 
EU.186 The bill of rights debate takes on new dimensions in this post-
Brexit world, where there may be novel opportunities for distinctive 
constitutional conversations to emerge. 
IX. WHERE NOW FOR THE BILL OF RIGHTS? 
This Article has shown just how difficult drafting and progressing 
a bill of rights can be for divided/post-conflict societies. As discussed 
earlier, those who favor a narrow approach in Northern Ireland tend to 
be from mainstream political unionism, bringing its own challenges 
and implications for advancing the discussions any further in the 
context of mutual communal vetoes. Nationalists/republicans on the 
other hand have traditionally supported an extensive range of rights 
protections, including civil and political rights as well as socio-
economic rights. The concern from this perspective is likely to be with 
any bill of rights that is minimalist or threatens to undercut existing 
guarantees. 
What might challenge this current stalemate? It is possible that the 
constitutional dynamics on the island of Ireland, and across the islands, 
may shift views. Indeed, during our project we noted increasing 
discussion about reconfigured arrangements on the island of Ireland. 
 
184. Ivan Lewis, Shadow Sec’y of State for Northern Ireland, speaking on “The View” 
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For example, might a point be reached where unionism/loyalism views 
a bill of rights as a necessary insurance policy in the face of future 
constitutional change? Bills of rights are political as well as legal 
documents—they get adopted because it is in someone’s political or 
other interest to adopt them or because groups struggle and demand 
rights protection. However, our research has shown that at present 
“elite political”187 leadership in Northern Ireland is lacking, and there 
is insufficient demand for this constitutional step to be taken.188 
The Article has also shown that the task of developing a bill of 
rights in Northern Ireland was headed by a “national human rights 
institution”, the Human Rights Commission. Experience elsewhere 
indicates that countries that have adopted a bill of rights, such as South 
Africa, Zimbabwe and Canada, have done so within an explicitly 
political context, and they are often drafted by politicians as part of the 
constitution-making process.189 During the negotiations leading to the 
Agreement the political parties agreed on a proposal for a bill of rights, 
but did not spend time deliberating on its contents.190 While there have 
been many suggestions about what was intended, this is not clear from 
the text of the Agreement itself. Rather the priority issues for both 
governments and the Northern Ireland political parties at the time were 
the constitutional relationships between Britain, Ireland, and Northern 
Ireland, alongside the arrangements for a new power-sharing Executive 
and Legislative Assembly. The discussions on human rights received 
less time during the negotiations, and the sections on the bill of rights 
were drafted in the later stages in what has been described as “a 
somewhat haphazard way”.191 The remit of the Commission under the 
Agreement is a prime example of the “haphazard way” the rights 
sections were included in the peace agreement. The fact that the 
Agreement left what is a major constitutional task to a Commission (to 
give advice only) and did not provide a pathway after the submission 
of the advice, remains problematic. There are valuable lessons here for 
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those negotiating such agreements in the future. It would, in particular, 
have been helpful if the drafters could have mapped out a legislative 
way forward. For those supportive of such human rights initiatives 
there may also be lessons in seizing the opportunities available at times 
when constitutional moments open up. There is clear evidence from the 
Northern Ireland experience that such moments can pass, and that 
anticipated gains in terms of rights and equality can simply fail to 
materialize. 
At the time of writing, and as noted, a way forward has been 
established, with the setting up of a new ad hoc Assembly 
Committee.192 The lack of cross-party political consensus remains a 
major obstacle to progress, and will present a formidable challenge to 
the Committee. It was apparent throughout the drafting process 
however, that unionist/nationalist divisions do not always neatly map 
on to the views of individuals and communities. While it is to be 
welcomed that the bill of rights is back on the political agenda, 
questions will remain about how the work will be structured, how 
participation will be ensured and, perhaps of most significance, how an 
acceptable outcome will be delivered. One possible way suggested to 
get support from the unionist political community is to put “the 
message out there that human rights apply to all of us.”193 A former 
unionist political representative took the view that there needed to be 
more public awareness amongst the unionist community about its aims: 
“the Bill of Rights and human rights isn’t threatening to anyone; they 
are something for everyone.”194 A PUP spokesperson suggested that, 
“we need to be arguing for a Bill of Rights—it’s about keeping all that 
political stuff out of it.”195 A DUP spokesperson suggested that it might 
help to progress the discussions, “if we talk about something like 
‘principles’, ‘guiding principles’ . . . ‘values’ then it could be quite 
different.”196 Sinn Féin acknowledged the difficulties over the language 
used to date: “language within Unionist politics is very important—
‘objective need’, ‘equality’/ ‘inequalities’—all those words are seen 
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from a DUP point of view as Nationalist/Republican language.”197 
There was some openness to the suggestion that there may be more 
support for a bill of rights if it was to be called something else, a Charter 
or a Covenant. The view expressed was that “it doesn’t matter what it’s 
called or where the rights are located as long as they’re there.”198 
Another way to assist the process and “put the message out there 
that human rights apply to all of us” is to consider “international 
instruments and experience”, as outlined in the Agreement.199 
International instruments can be influential in expediting compromises 
when there is a specific controversial issue at stake. Arguably 
international law can help dispel concerns by highlighting what is 
deemed to work internationally. In this way, it can enable people to 
focus on a standard that exists and has evolved outside of the particular 
circumstances of Northern Ireland, and therefore offers some distance 
between the frenetic and impassioned local argumentation and what 
might be necessary to meet agreed international standards. Indeed, the 
use of international standards has been described as a: 
distinguishing feature of rights development in the contemporary 
era . . . the contemporary situation reminds us that no process of 
developing a Charter or a Bill of Rights can take place in a void 
and be reflective merely of the specific context in which this is 
taking place.200 
That said, international law should be regarded as a “tool” but not 
the “master”,201 helping politicians to come to a solution that best 
reflects the particular exigencies of their society. A contextually 
insensitive approach is unlikely to work in Northern Ireland. While 
using alternative language and international standards may help, 
progress will only be made if there is effective engagement and a will 
to deliver an outcome. In this context, it is imperative for both 
governments, as co-guarantors of the Agreement, to assist the process. 
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X. CONCLUSION 
We share the view, heard often in our discussions, that people 
should be ambitious for human rights and equality in Northern Ireland, 
and that the time is right to reopen this constitutional conversation. A 
firm position emerged from many participants in our project that it 
remains a society that still needs a bill of rights. The process has its 
basis in the Agreement, and resulted in the submission of advice by the 
Human Rights Commission in 2008.202 The UK Government refused 
to take the next constitutional step and was unwilling to legislate based 
on that advice.203 It has continually pointed to the absence of 
“consensus”, by which it means the objections of the unionist political 
parties in Northern Ireland.204 Some momentum has been restored 
through the establishment of an ad hoc Committee in the Northern 
Ireland Assembly. Whether this Committee simply provides another 
re-run of familiar political disputes remains to be seen. More than 
twenty years later, the enactment of a bill of rights for Northern Ireland 
does not appear imminent. In this Article we argue that there are lessons 
from this experience for those embarking on such a major 
constitutional enterprise in any post-conflict setting. 
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